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Abstract: This study reports on computational experiments for an agent-based
labor market-model-with adaptive choice'and refusal of worksite' partners and with
endogenously evolving worksite behaviors. Two treatment factors ^e experimentally
varied: market structure; and ex ante capacity constraints on potential work offers and
job openings.- Particular atteiition is focused on experimentally determined correlations
between treatment factors and the formation of contractual networks among workers
and employers, and between' contractual network"formation and the'types'o!f worksite
interactions and welfare outcomes that these contractual networks support. i.
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L Introduction
An interesting theoretical literature stressing job search and matcMng in labor markets
has flourished following the influential work in this area by Jovanovic (1979), Diamond (1982),
and Pissarides (1985) in the late nineteen seventies and early nineteen eighties. See, for example,
Pissarides (1990), Hosios (1990), Mortenson and Pissarides (1994), Aghion and Howitt (1994), and
MacLeod and Malcomson (1998). To achieve analytical tractability, however, researchers in this
hterature commonly postulate an aggregate matching function that proxies the complicated process
of employer recruitment, worker search, and mutual evaluation. That is, the intense individualistic
rivalry among workers and employers that characterizes many real-world labor markets is not
modelled. Moreover, again for tractability, the competition of ideas within agents is generally not
considered; attention is largely focused on steady-state behavior.^
In a preliminary study [Tesfatsion (1998b)], it was conjectured that some of the tractability
problems encountered in analytical labor market studies might be alleviated by taking an agent-
based computational approach. To explore this possibility, a labor market framework was designed
that built on the computational tra^e networkgame (TNG) developed in Tesfatsion (1995,1997a,b,
1998a) for studying the formation and evolution of buyer-seller trade networks under alternatively
specified market structures.
The TNG labor market framework comprises a collection of workers and employers that evolve
over time. Workers and employers repeatedly choose and refuse worksite partners on the basis
of continually updated expected utility, engage in worksite interactions modelled as two-person
games, and evolve their worksite strategies on the basis of past interaction experiences. This
^Important exceptions exist, of course. For example, Pissarides (1985) studies the dynamics of adjustment in
labor markets in response to shocks. Montgomery (1991) explores the relationship between social networks and labor
market outcomes when employers are able to use a stochastically determined social network among workers to relay
Job offers to the acquaintances of high-ability workers. In addition, motivated in part by an early seminal paper
by Myerson (1977), an interesting analytical literature has developed in recent years focusing on the endogenous
formation of agent linkages in social communication networks, which has potentially important implications for labor
market modelling. See, for example, Kirman et al. (1986), van den Nouweland (1993), Jackson and Wolinsky (1996),
and Watts and Strogatz (1998).
frainewbrk'permits many'aspects of'labor market's to be determined'endogenously on the basis of
local agent interactions that analytical labor market studies commonly specify "in more restricted
ways, either as exogenously given attributes or as assumed aggregate'steady-state'relationships.'
Examples-of these endogenized aspects include:' worker'preference orders over potential employers;
employer preference'orders bvef^p'otehtikl workers; intensity of job'search iactivity; search oppor
tunity costs; contractu^ networks'among workers'and- employers; worker aiid employef 'worksite
behaviors;" worker conipensatidns; eniployef earnings;'quit'rates; firing Tates;'-VcLcancy rates; and
uneriiployment"rates. ' "" ' • ' • ' . i, ; t • - - i
This study reports on computational fecperiments for the'TNG lalaor maxket^ffamework.^ As
stressed by Diairiond (1982) and Hosios (1990,''pp."285-288), entry/exit externalities^arise in la
bor search and match' modds because, ceteris parihus^ each' additional" worker' makes it easier for
employers *t'o fill job" vacancies but harder for workers to'find job openings, and each additional
employer makes it easier for workers to find'job openings but harder for employers to'filljob vacan
cies. The experimental design used in'the current study examinies'the long-fun'effects ofentry/exit
externalities on worksite behavior, contractual network formation, arid-'social welfare under ^ter-
native market structures as the nature of the'entry/exit externalities is'varied from being strongly
biased in favor of workers to being strongly biased'infavor of employers.
More-precisely; the experiment^'design of this study involves two' treatment factor's: labor
market structure;' and ex ante capacity constraints on potential work offers and-job openings. Three'
types oflabor market structures are investigated: two-sided markets coniprising'pure workers and
pure employers; partially fluid markets comprising pure'workers, pure employers,' and agents capable
of functioning as both workers and employers; arid endogenous-type markets in which each agent is
capable of functioning as both a worker and an employer. For each labor market structure, various
^All labor market experiments reported in this study were implemented using .version 105b of the TNG source
code developed by McFadzean and Tesfatsion (1997), which in turn is supported by SimBioSys, a general class
frarnework for evolutionary simulations developed by McFaxlzean (1995). .Version, 105b of the TNG source code and
SimBioSys are both available for downloading as freeware at the current author's Web site, along vrith extensive user
instructions.
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ex ante capacity constraints are considered ranging from high excess job capacity (many potential
job openings relative to potential work offers) to extremely tight job capacity (few potential job
openings relative to potential work offers).
For each specification of the two treatment factors, twenty runs ("economies") are generated
for the TNG labor market using twenty different pseudo-random number seed values. In examining
these sample economies, particular attention is focused on experimentally determined correlations
between the treatment factors and the formation of contractual networks among workers and em
ployers, and between contractual network formation and the types of strategic worksite interactions
and welfare outcomes that these contractual networks support.
One interesting finding is that unemployment and vacancy rates are not as tightly correlated
with ex ante capacity constraints as might be expected. Observed unemployment rates among
workers do tend to increase as job capacity is incrementally tightened and observed vacancy rates
among employers do tend to decline. On the other hand, workers and employers favored ex ante
with greater market power tend to evolve more predacious worksite behaviors, which can lead to
increased firing rates (employers refusing further work offers from predacious workers) and quit
rates (exploited workers directing future work offers elsewhere).
Another interesting finding observed for each treatment is that multiple types of contractual
networks can arise and persist, each supporting a distinct pattern of worksite behaviors and welfare
outcomes. This finding is consistent with the findings of analytical two-sided labor market studies
[e.g., Diamond (1982)] concerning the existence of multiple steady-state search equilibria. In the
current process study, however, a histogram is obtained for each treatment showing the proportion
of economies that evolve each type of network formation, which provides suggestive information
regarding the size and importance of their basins of attraction.
Moreover, the number of contractual networks that arise and persist for each treatment tends
to increase as one moves from endogenous-type markets to two-sided markets to partially-fluid
markets. In particular, the presence in partially-fluidmarkets of a subset offlexible worker-employer
agents able to ''crowd out" pure workers or pure employers tends to lead to increased volatility in
network formation, worksite behaviors, and welfare outcomes.
Although multiple network formations are observed for each treatment, the distribution of these
network formations and the nature of the worksite behaviors they support tend to be strongly cor
related with the differential market power of workers and employers as implied by the specification
of the treatment factors. For example, in conditions of tight job capacity in which pure workers
have low match rates, the predominant types of networks that form tend to support aggressive
and predacious employer behavior against pure workers. Conversely, in conditions of excess job
capacity in which pure employers have low match rates, the predominant types of networks that
form tend to support aggressive and predacious worker behavior against pure employers. These
experimental findings provide support for the analytical studies of Pissarides (1985), Rubinstein
and Wolinsky (1985), and Wolinsky (1987), among others, who explore search and match models
in which the relative returns to the participants of a match are assumed to be affected by their
relative match probabilities.
The expJoitation opportunities that arise due to differential market power induce structural
changes in agent worksite behaviors as the agents evolve their worksite strategies over time in re
sponse to past worksite experiences. In consequence, workers and employers who succeed in estab
lishing persistent relationships (matches) with each other tend to express relationship-specific work
site behaviors; namely, an initial transient "handshake" involving some degree ofnon-cooperative
behavior on the part of both match participants as attempted exploitation results in retaliation,
followed by a persistent repeated action pattern in which the agent with the greater market power
limits his exploitation to a level that the other participant is willing to tolerate. Interestingly, struc
turally distinct workers (both pure workers and worker-employers) who interact repeatedly with
the same employer generally come to express the same handshake and persistent action patterns
with that employer, so that the employer acts as acoordinating device across workers; and similarly
for groups ofemployers (both pure employers and worker-employers) who interact with the same
worker.
Despite this variation at the level of individual agents, however, the average welfare levels
achieved by each agent type (pure workers, pure employers, and worker-employers) across the
sample of economies generated for each treatment tend to strongly reflect the dilferential market
power of workers and employers as implied by the specification of the treatment factors. These
average welfare levels typically fixate at approximately constant levels within the first twenty-five
agent generations and persist at these levels through 100 agent generations, the maximum number
of generations tested.
Another interesting related finding is that the efficiency and stability criteria commonly used to
evaluate the performance ofmatching mechanisms in steady-state (or static) labor search and match
models turn out to be highly incomplete indicators of welfare outcomes in the current TNG labor
market context. The steady-state viewpoint hides the strong role played by market structure and
ex ante capacity constraints in determining the types of persistent matching networks that evolve,
the types of persistent interaction behaviors that these networks support, and the transactions costs
and opportunity costs to agents that the achievement of these persistent networks and behaviors
entails.
More precisely, as will be clarified in later sections, the matching outcomes generated for workers
and employers in the TNG labor market are generated via a Gale-Shapley matching mechanism that
guarantees on a period by period basis both Pareto efficiency for workers (the agents who make
offers) and pairwise stability. These local optimality properties take agent preference rankings
over potential partners as given, however, whereas in actuality there is a continuous feedback
between preference rankings and agent interactions over time. In consequence, these local optimality
properties have very little global predictive power; they tend to be overwhelmed by the strong
channeling effects of market structure and ex ante capacity contraints. This suggests the need,
in dynamic contexts, for more global optimality criteria for matching mechanisms that take into
account the joint determination of matching networks and interaction behaviors over time.
The TNG labor market framework is described in Section 11. Section III constructs ex post mea
sures for the classification of network forinations, worksite behaviors, and welfare outcomes. The
experimental design of the study is outlined in SectionIV, and a detailed discussion of experimental
findings is presented in Section V. Cbncludirig remarks are given in Sectiori' VL
i . '
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II. The TNG Labor Market Framework
4 I
The TNG labor market-consists of three disjoint (and possibly null) subpopulations of agents
that separately evolve over time: pure workers who make work offers; pure^employers who receive
work offers; and worker-employers capable of both making and receiving work offers. The pure
workers and worker-employers are collectively referred to as workers, and the worker-employers
and pure employers are collectively referred to as employers. Each worker can have no more than
wq work offers outstanding to employers at any given time, and each employer can accept no
more than eq work offers from workers at any given time, where the work offer quota wq and the
acceptance quota eq can be any positive integers."^ Although highly simplified, these parametric
specifications will be seen in Section IV, below, to permit the study of a variety of labor market
structures operating under different ex ante capacity constraints.
As outlined in Table 1, each agent in the initial generation is constructed and assigned a random
strategy governing worksite interactions. The agents then enter into a nested pair of generation
cycle and trade cycle loops during which they repeatedly determine contractual partnerships, engage
in worksite interactions, update their expected utility assessments for worksite partners based on
newly recorded payoffs, and evolve their worksite strategies over time.
The TNG labor market framework facilitates the study oflabor markets from an agent-based
perspective in two key ways. First, as depicted in Table 2, each agent is instantiated as an au-
tonomous, endogenously-interacting software agent with internally stored state information and
When wq exceeds 1, the workers can be interpreted as some type of information service provider (broker, consul
tant, ...) able to provide services,to more than oneemployer at a time.
int main () {
initO;
For (G = l,...,GMax) {
lnitGen();
For (I = •{
MatchlVaders^);
Trade();
UpdateExpO;
)
AssessFituessOi
Output ();
EvolveGen();
}
Return 0;
// ComiTucl initial subpopulations of pure workers,
({ worker-employers, and pure employers with
// random worksite strategies
// EnitT the ^encraiion cycle hop.
// GeneTaiion Cycle:
// Configitre all agents with user-supplied
// parameter values (initial expected utility
// levels, work offer/acceptance guotasv--)-
// EnteT ihe trade cycle loop.
// Trade Cycle:
11 Determine worksite partners,
// given expected utilities,
// and record refusal and
11 wallflower payoffs.
// Engage in worksite interactions
// and record worksite payoffs.
// Update expected utilities
// using newly recorded payofis.
// Environmental Step:
11 Assess agent fitness scores.
// Output agent information.
// Evolvtion Step:
f ( Separately evoJve the worksite strategies of pure
// workers, worker-employers, and pure employers.
Table 1: Logical Flow of the TNG Labor Market Framework
with internal behavioral rules. The agents can therefore engage in anticipatory behavior. More
over, using stored agent addresses together with internalized communication protocols, they can
communicate with each other at event-triggered times, a feature not present in standard economic
models.
Second, as seen in Table 1, the TNG labor market framework is modular in design. This means
that experimentation with alternative specifications for market structure, search and matching
among workers and employers, worksite interactions, expectation formation and updating, and
evolution of worksite strategies can easily be undertaken — much like changing a lightbulb in a
multi-bulb lamp — as long as the interfaces (inputs and outputs) for the modules implement
ing these specifications remain unchanged. Moreover, each of these modules can potentially be
grounded in agent-initiated actions in the sense that the module is implemented via behavioral
rules internal to the agents. Finally, the transitory and longer-run implications of each alternative
class Agent
{
Internal State Infonnation:
My physiological attributes;
My endowments;
My beliefs/preferences;
Addresses for other agents;
Additional data about other agents.
Internal Behavioral Rules:
Rules for communicating with other agents;
Rules for gathering, processing, and updating information;
Rules for determining my contractual partners;
Rules for conducting my worksite interactions;
Rules for updating my beliefs/preferences;
Rules for calculating xny welfare;
Rules for altering mv rules .
}:
Table 2: Schematic Description of an Agent
module specification can be studied at three different levels: individual characteristics of workers
and employers; interactions among workers and employers (network formation); and social welfare
as measured by descriptive statistics such as average agent welfare and unemployment rates.
A briefdescription will now be given for the particular module specifications used in all exper
iments reported below. See McFadzean and Tesfatsion (1997) for a more careful description.
If an employer accepts a work offer from a worker in any given trade cycle, the worker and
employer are said to be matched for that trade cycle. Each match constitutes a mutually agreed
upon contract stating that the worker shall be employed at the worksite of the employer until the
beginning of the next trade cycle. These contracts are risky in that outcomes are not assured.
Specifically, each matched worker and employer engage in a worksite interaction modelled as
a two-person prisoner's dilemma game reflecting the basic efficiency wage hypothesis that worker
effort levels are affected by overall working conditions (e.g., wage levels, respectful treatment, safety
considerations, .„). The worker can either cooperate (exert high work effort) or defect (engage
in shirking). Similarly, the employer can either cooperate (provide good working conditions) or
defect (provide substandard working conditions). The range of possible payoffs is assumed to be
the same for each match in each trade cycle: namely, as seen in Table 3, a cooperator whose
Worker
Employer
c d
(C,C) (L,H)
(H,L) (D,D)
Table 3: Payoff Matrix for the Worksite Prisoner's Dilemma Game
contractual partner defects receives the lowest possible payoff L (the sucker payoff); a defector
whose contractual partner also defects receives a payoff D\ a cooperator whose contractual partner
also cooperates receives a payoff C; and a defector whose contractual partner cooperates receives
the highest possible payoff H (the temptation payoff). The payoffs are assumed to be measured in
utility terms and to be normalized about 0, so that L<D<Q<C<H. They are also assumed
to satisfy the usual regularity condition {L + H)/2 < C guaranteeing that mutual cooperation
dominates alternating cooperation and defection on average.
Matches between workers and employers are determined using a modified version of the well-
studied "deferred acceptance mechanism" originally designed by Gale and Shapley (1962).® Under
this modified mechanism, hereafter referred to as the deferred choice and refusal (DCR) mechanism,
each worker submits up to wq work offers to employers he ranks as most preferable on the basis
of expected payoff and who he judges to be tolerable in the sense that their expected payoff is
not negative. Similarly, each employer selects up to eq of his received offers that he finds tolerable
and most preferable on the basis of expected payoff and he places them on a waiting list; all other
offers are refused. Workers redirect refused offers to tolerable preferred employers who have not yet
refused them, if any such employers exist. Once employers stop receiving new offers, they accept
all work offers currently on their waiting lists.
^See Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a careful detailed discussion of Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance matching
mechanisms, including a discussion of the way in which the Association of American Medical Collegessince WWII has
slowly evolved such an algorithm (the National Intern Matching Program) as a way of matching interns to hospitals
in the United States.
A worker incurs a transactions cost in the form of a negative refusal payoff R each and every
time that an employer'refuses one of his work offers during a trade cycle; the employer who does
the refusing is not penalized.® An agent who neither,submits nor accepts work offers during a trade
cycle receives a single wallflower payoff 0 for the entire, trade cycle., The refusal and w^lflower
payoffs are each assumed to he measured,in utility.terms. , ,
Agents use a simple learning algorithm tOi update their expected utilities, on the basis'of new
payoff information.. Each-agent'v assigns an exogenously given initial expected utility U° to each
potential contractual partner z with whom, he has not yet interacted. •Each time an interaction
with z takes place, .t> fornis-an updated .expected utility assessment for.z by summing U° together
with all payoffs received to date from interactions with z and dividing this sum by one plus the
number of interactions with 2. , t,. , •
The worksite behavior of each, agent is governed by a finite-memory pure strategy for playing
a prisoner's dilemma game with an arbitrary partner an indefinite number of times, hereafter
referred to as a worksite strategy. At the commencement of each trade cycle loop, agents have no
information about the worksite strategies ofother agents; they can onlylearn about these strategies
. .'l t . ' .1 • . '
by engaging other agents in repeated worksite interactions and observing the actions and utility
payoffs that ensue. In consequence,each agent's choice of an action in a current worksiteinteraction
with another agent is determined entirely on the basis of his own past interactions with this other
agent and/or his initial expected utility assessment of the agent. Each agent thus keeps separate
' . • ' , ' ' •"/ ' .'J • ! I • I
track of the particular state he is in with regard to each ofhis potential worksite partners.^
At the end of each trade cycle loop, the worksite strategies of pure workers, pure employers,
arid worker-employeirs are separately evolved by means of standaWly specified genetic algorithms
®This is equivalent'to assumirig: (a) each worker incurs a transactions cost for each work offer he makes; and (bj
the worksite payoffs in Table 3 are each increased by the amount of this transactions cost, so that a worker who
succeeds in having a work offer accepted is able to recoup the transactions cost he incurred by making this offer.
The implications of this type, of informational assumption in sepch and match contexts has been explored by
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990). They show that, even in the absence of trading frictions, noncompetitive equilibria
can arise when agent behavior depends on specific information such as the identity of trading partners and personal
histories with trading partners. '
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involving recombination, mutation, and elitism operations.® This evolution is meant to reflect
tlie formation and transmission of new ideas rather than biological reproduction. Specifically, if a
worksite strategy successfully results in high fitness for an agent of a particular type, where fitness
is measured by average payoff, then other agents of the same type are led to modify their own
strategies to more closely resemble the successful strategy.
An important caution is in order here, however. Given the extent of information currently
allowed to agents during the evolution step — i.e., knowledge of the complete strategies of all
other agents of the same type, whether expressed in interactions or not — the evolution step is
more appropriately interpreted as an iterative stochastic search algorithm for determining potential
equilibrium strategy configurations rather than as a cultural transmission mechanism per se. The
resulting welfare outcomes will be used in subsequent work as benchmarks against which to assess
the effectiveness of more realistically modelled cultural transmission mechanisms.
III. Descriptive Statistics
In this section care is taken to explain the measures that have been constructed to aid in
the experimental determination of correlations between treatment factors and contractual network
formation, and between contractual network formation and the types of worksite behaviors and
social welfare outcomes that these contractual networks support. Contractual networks depict
who is working for whom, and with what regularity. Worksite behavior refers to the specific
actions undertaken by workers and employers in their worksite interactions. Finally, social welfare
®More precisely, for each subpopulation of agents, the genetic algorithm evolves a new collection of agent worksite
strategies from the existing collection of agent worksite strategies by applying the following four steps: (1) Evalua
tion, in which a fitness score is assigned to each strategy in the existing strategy collection; (2) Recombination, in
which offspring (new ideas) are constructed by combining the genetic material (structural characteristics) of pairs
of parent strategies chosen from among the most fit strategies in the existing strategy collection; (3) Mutation, in
which additional variations (new ideas) are constructed by mutating the structural characteristics of each offspring
strategy with some small probability; and (4) Replacement, in which the most fit (elite) worksite strategies in the
existing collection of strategies are retained for the new collection of strategies and the least fit worksite strategies
in the existing strategy collection are replaced with offspring strategies. See McFadzean and Tesfatsion (1997) for
a more detailed discussion of this use of genetic algorithms in the TNG, and see Goldberg (1989) and Mitchell and
Forrest (1994) for a general discussion of genetic algorithm design and use.
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refers to the overall utility levels achieved by each agent type (pure workers, pure employers, and
worker-employers) from repeated worksite interactions in a possibly changing network of contractual
partners.
A. Classification of Contmctual Networks by Distance
As noted in the introduction, all of the TNG labor market experiments reported in this
study are implemented using version 105b of the TNG source code developed by McFadzean and
Tesfatsion (1997). Let s denote a seed value for the pseudo-random number generator incorporated
in this code, and let e denote &potential TNG economy^ i.e., an economy characterized structurally
by the TNG source code together with all of the user-specified TNG parameter values apart from
s. The realized TNG economy generated from e, given the seed value 5, is denoted by (5,e).
Worksite strategies are represented as finite state machines,^ hence the actions undertaken
by any agent v in repeated worksite interactions with another agent z must eventually cycle.
Consequently, these actions can be summarized in the form of a worksite history H:P, where the
handshake H is a (possibly null) string ofworksite actions that form a non-repeatedpattern and the
persistent portion P is a (possibly null) string of worksite actions that are cyclically repeated. For
p-xample, letting c denote cooperation and d denote defection, the worksite history ddd'.dc indicates
that agent i; defected against agent z in his first three worksite interactions with z and thereafter
alternated between defection and cooperation.
Two agents i' and z are said to exhibit a persistent relationhip during a given trade cycle loop
T of a realized TNG economy (s,e) if the following two conditions hold: (a) their worksite histories
with each other during the course of T take the form and H^:P, with nonnull and and
(b) accepted work offers between v and 2 do not permanently cease during T either by choice (a
fimle state machtne (FSM) is a system comprising a finite coUeclion ofinternal states together with a stale
transition function that gives the next internal stale the system will enter as a function of the current state together
with current system inputs. For the application at hand, the inputs are the actions selected by a worker and an
employer engaged in a worksite interaction. See McFadzean and Tesfatsion (1997) for a more detailed discussion and
Olustration of the FSM representation used in the TNG source code.
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permanent switch away to strictly preferred contractual partners) or by refusal (one agent becoming
intolerable to the other because his expected utility drops below zero).
A possible pattern of contractual relationships among the agents V{e) in the final generation of
a potential TNG economy c is referred to as a contractual network, denoted generically by K{e).
Each contractual network K{e) is represented in the form of a directed graph in which the vertices
of the graph represent the agents V(€), the edges of the graph (directed arrows) represent work
offers directed from workers to employers, and the edge weight on any edge denotes the number of
accepted work offers (contracts) between the worker and employer connected by the edge.
Let V^{e) denote a base contractual pattern that partially or fully specifies a potential pattern
of contractual relationships among the agents V{e) in the potential TNG economy e. For example,
V®(e) couJd designate that each worker directs offers to at least two employers. Let K°{e) denote
the base contractual network class consisting of aU contractual networks A'(e) whose edges conform
to the base contractual pattern V°(e). Also, let K{s,e) denote the contractuaJ network depicting
the actual pattern of contractual relationships among the agents V(e) in the final generation of the
realized TNG economy (5,e). The reduced form contractual network K^{s,e) derived from K(s,e)
by eliminating all edges of K{s,e) that correspond to non-persistent relationships is referred to as
the persistent contractual network for (5,c).
The distance D°[s^e) between the persistent contractual network A'^(5,e) and the base cbn^
tractual network class K°(e) for a realized TNG economy (5,e) is then defined to be the number
of vertices (agents) in K'^{s,e) whose arrow patterns (persistent relationships) fail to conform to
the base contractual pattern V°(e). This distance measure provides a rough way to clcissify the
different types of persistent contractual networks observed to arise for a given value of e as the seed
value s is varied.
B. Classification of Worksite Behaviors and Welfare Outcomes
An agent in the final generation of a realized TNG economy (5,c) is referred to as an
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unprovokeddefector (UD) if lie engages^in at least one-defection' against- another agent who has not
previously defected"against him; The' vector giVing'the separate UD'percentages for pure workers,
pure employers, and worker-employers in.ithe''final'generation of agents for':(5,e) is referred to as
the UD profile for {s, e). The UD profile measures the extent toiwhich the different types-of agents
behave agressively in worksite interactions with contractual partners-who are either strangers or
who so far have been consistentlyicooperative:^^ ..b < i ' i /,
Also, an agent in. the final generation of a realized,TNG economy (5, e) is referred to as a per-
Mstent wallflower (PWFj if he constitutes-an isolated vertex of,the persistent contractual network
if. ' -\ ' > • . •
K^{sye). Alternatively, the agent is referred to as a repeat defector (RD) if he establishes at least
one persistent relationship for which the persistent portion P of his worksite history H:P includes
• 5 i ' . I • .ip/- \ / • 'i. , . I i(,' - , ' I 'I
a defection d. If, instead, the agent establishes at least one persistent relationship and his worksite
^ ' •' ' ' •. ' "
history for each of his persistent relationships has the general form H:Cy he is referred to as a
persistent cooperator (PC). By construction, each agent in the final generation of (5^,€) belongs to
' ' • , ' • ' . • • , li I • • I' li N; • ... • ^
one and only one of these categories; i.e., he must be either a PWF, or an RD, or a PC.
' - s • n . . ' . ' v' . I ' ' I • I ' • • ' • . '
The vectorsgiving the separate PWF, RD, and PC percentagesfor pure workers, pure employers,
and worker-employers in the final generation of (5,e) are referred to as the PWF profile, the RD
profile, and the PC profile for (5, e), respectively. The PWF profile measures the extent to which
the different agent types in this final generation fail to establish anypersistent relationships. Since
theDCR matching mechanism ensures that each worker in theTNG labormarket attempts tomake
at least onework offer in the iriitial cycle ofeach trade cycle loop in which he participates, the PWF
percentage for pure workers gives their persistent unemployment rate. Also, the PWF percentage
for pure employers gives their persistent vacancy rate. On the other hand, the PWF percentage
' • ' . • f •' '1-' 1 j '. ,11 - j • • ' •
for worker-employers measures the extent to which they are both persistently unemployed (as
' L, ^ : • '
workers) and persistently vacant (as employers). The RD profile measures the extent to which the
The importance of stance towards strangers in determining subsequent outcomes in path dependent contexts
such as the.TNG labor,market framework has,been stressed by Orbell and Dawes„(1993). j.
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different agent types in the final generation of (5,e) establish persistent relationships characterized
by predacious behavior (recurrent or continuous defection). Finally, the PC profile measures the
extent to which the different agent types in this final generation establish persistent relationships
characterized by fiiUy cooperative behavior.
The vector that separately gives the average fitness score for pure workers, pure employers, and
worker-employers, respectively, in the final generation of agents for a realized TNG economy (5, e)
is referred to as the FIT profile for (5, e).' The FIT profile constitutes a measure of social welfare.
IV. Experimental Design
The labor market experiments reported in the following section focus on three simple labor
market structures: endogenous-type markets comprising 24 worker-employers; two-sided markets
comprising 12 pure workers and 12 pure employers; and partially-fluid markets comprising 8 pure
workers, 8 pure employers, and 8 worker-employers. For each market structure, four different
configurations for the worker offer quota wq and employer acceptance quota eq are examined: high
excess job capacity {eq » wq); zero excess job capacity {eq = wq —1); tight job capacity (eg = 1
and wq = 2); and extremely tight job capacity {eq « wq). Thus, for each market structure, the
focus is on ex ante capacity effects as measured by the ratio of potential work offers to potential job
openings, holding fixed the market concentration levels as measured by relative numbers of workers
and employers.
The values for all remaining parameters are maintained at fixed values throughout all exper
iments. Table 4 lists these fixed parameter values along with the specific agent type and quota
values for a two-sided market experiment with high excess job capacity. The parameter values in
Table 4, together with the TNG source code, constitute a potential TNG economy e in the sense
defined in Section III.A.
For each tested e, twenty TNG economies (s,e) were experimentally generated using twenty
arbitrarily selected seed values s for the TNG pseudo-random number generator.^^ Thepersistent
•^^Tliese twenty seed values are as follows: 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 45, 65, 63, 31, 11, 64, 41, 66, 13, 54, 641, 413,
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// PARAMETER VALUES HELD FIXED ACROSS EXPERIMENTS
GMax = 50 // Total number of generations.
IMax = 150 // Number of trade cycles per trade cycle loop.
AgentCouni = 24 // Total number of agents.
RefusalPayoff = -0.5 // Payoff R received by a refused agent.
WallflowerPayofT = +0.0 // Payoff W received by an inactive agent.
Sucker = -1.6 // Lowest possible worksite payoff. L.
BothDefect = -0.6 // Mutual defection worksite payoff, D.
BothCoop = +1.4 // Mutual cooperation worksite payoff, C.
Temptation = +3.4 // Highest possible worksite payoff, H.
InitExpPayoff = +1.4 // Initial expected utility level,
Elite = 67 // GA elite percentJkge for each agent type.
MutationRate = .005 // GA mutation rate (bit toggle probability).
FsmStates = 16 // Number of internal FSM states.
FsmMemory = 1 // FSM memory (in bits) for past move rec^.
// PARAMETER VALUES VARIED ACROSS EXPERIMENTS
FureWorkers = 12 // Number of pia-e workers.
PuxeEmployers =12 // Niunber of pure employers.
WorkerEmployers = 0 // Number of worker-employers.
WorkerQuota = 1 // Worker offer quota wq.
EmployerQuota = 12 // Employer acceptance quota eq.
Table 4; Parameter Values for a Two-Sided Labor Market with High Excess Job Capacity
contractual network h ^(5,6) for each run s was determined and graphically depicted, and the mean
and standard deviation for the UD (unprovoked defector), PWF(persistent wallflower), RD (repeat
defector), PC (persistent cooperator), and FIT (fitness) profiles were determined and recorded.
A base contractual pattern Vie) was then specified for each tested e. Although the choice of
this base pattern is simply a normalization determining a 0 point for the distance measure and
hence intrinsically arbitrary, the degree of specificity ofthis base pattern governs the dispersion of
theresulting distance values and the extent towliich these distance values display useful correlations
with worksite behaviors as measured by the UD, PWF, RD, PC, and FIT profiles. In practice,
then, the choice of the base contractual pattern was fine-tuned so that the resulting distance
values provided a meaningful informative classification of network types. Given V°{e), the distance
D^is^e) ofK^{s,e) from K°{€) was recorded for each run s, and a histogram for thedistance values
425, and 212. The final fourteen vaJues were determined by random throws of two and three die. TheTNGsource
code implementation of the TNG labor market framework uses pseudo-random number values in the initialization of
worksite strategies, in the matching process to break ties among equally preferred worksite partners, and in genetic
algorithm recombination and mutation operations applied to worksite strategies in the evolution step.
By construction, as explained in Section III.B, the PWF, RD, and PC profiles must sum to the total percentages
of agent types. Consequently, only the PWF and PC profiles are reported below in the table presentations of
experimental findings.
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D°(s,e) Wcis constructed giving tlie percentage of runs s corresponding to each possible distance
value.
Finally, as a rough stability check, the number of generations was also increased to 100 for each
tested potential economy e and the minimum, maximum, and average fitness scores for the agents
in each of the 100 generations were graphically generated for each realised economy (5,e).
V. Experimental Findings
A. Overview
•A general discussion of the principal experimental findings is presented in Section I. In this
section, additional clarification of this general discussion is first provided by making use of the more
precise terminology and measures introduced in the intervening" Sections II through IV. A more
detailed discussion of experimental findings is then given on a case by case basis.
In two-sided and partially-fluid economies e, unemployment rates as measured by persistent
wallflower (PWF) percentages for pure workers tend to increase as job capacity is incrementally
tightened whereas vacancy rates as measured by PWF percentages for pure employers tend to
decline. Nevertheless, countervailing forces at least partially offset these basic market power effects.
Specifically, agents who are favored with greater ex ante market power tend to express more
aggressiveand predacious worksite behavior, in the sense that they engage in more UD (unprovoked
defection) and RD (repeat defection) in their worksite interactions. This can result in unemploy
ment due to firings, i.e., unemployment due to employer decisions to refuse all further work offers
from aggressive and/or predacious workers; and it can also result in vacancies due to quits as
exploited workers direct their future work offers elsewhere. Also, for economies e characterized
ex ante by extremely tight job capacity, the predominant outcome is complete coordination failure
(unemployment rates and vcicancy rates of 100 percent) despite the ex ante market power advantage
held by pure employers. The difficulty is that the high transactions costs (negative refusal payoffs)
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accumulated by workers in their attempts to find job openings tend to prevent the formation of
any persistent relationships between workers and employers.
A second interesting finding observed for many (if not all) of the twenty realized economies (5,e)
generated for each tested economy e is the remarkable stability exhibited by the average fitness
scores for different agent types from one generation to the next, with stability often setting in as
early as generation 10. This observed stability in average fitness scores occurs despite repeated
changes induced in the underlying worksite strategies of agents by repeated applications of genetic
algorithm operations. Runs (5, e) for which instabilities in average fitness scores were detected are
noted in the discussion of specific experimented findings, below.
A third interesting finding observed for the twenty realized economies (5,e) generated for each
tested economy e is the existence of multiple distinct forms of persistent contractual networks
h^{ss€). More precisely, the distance values D°{s,e) for these persistent contractual networks
lend to cluster around a small but multiple number of isolated distance values. Endogenous-type
economies tend to have from one to two distinct clusters for each capacity treatment; two-sided
markets tend to have from two to three distinct clusters for each capacity treatment; and partially-
fluid maricets tend to have three distinct clusters for each capacity treatment. In general, each
of these distinct clusters supports a distinct pattern of worksite behaviors and welfare outcomes
for the different agent types. That is, the mean distance value for each distance cluster tends
to be strongly correlated with the mean UD, PWF, RD, PC, and FIT profiles calculated for the
cluster. Consequently, for the TNG labor market framework at hand, there does not appear to be
a uniinodal central-tendency network distribution in the sense defined by Banks and Carley (1994).
A fourth interesting finding is that the welfare outcomes supported by the various forms of
persistent contractual networks that arise for each tested two-sided and partially-fluid
economy e tend to strongly reflect the differential market power ofworkers and employers as implied
by the specification of the treatment factors for e. More precisely, in conditions of either high excess
job capacity (which favors workers) or zero or tight job capacity (which favors employers), the most
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predominant network forms that arise and persist tend to support welfare outcomes under which the
advantaged agent type attains not only a markedly higher welfare level than other agent types but
also a markedly higher welfare level than this advantaged agent type attains under other network
forms observed to arise for this e. This correlation between welfare outcomes and market power
breaks down, however, when job capacity is extremely tight. In the latter case the most predominant
persistent network form that arises and persists is a completely disconnected network consisting of
workers and employers who have all devolved to wallflowers and who all attain approximately zero
welfare levels.
Finally, a fifth interesting finding is that the efficiency and stability criteria conventionally used
to evaluate the performance of matching mechanisms in steady-state or static market contexts turn
out to be highly incomplete indicators of performance for the TNG labor market.
As detailed in Section II, the DCR mechanism used to match workers and employers in all ex
periments reported in this study is a version of the well-known matching mechanism developed by
Gale and Shapley (1962). The matching outcomes generated via the DCR mechanism in each trade
cycle have been shown in Tesfatsion (1995, 1997a) to have the usual local optimality properties
associated with Gale-Shapiey type matching mechanisms: namely, pairwise stability; and Pareto
optimality from the vantage point of workers, the agents who actively make offers. Nevertheless,
the long-run outcomes observed in these evolutionary labor market experiments include autarkic
economies in which all agents are persistent wallflowers, exploitive economies in which employers
persistently defect against cooperate workers or workers persistently defect against cooperative em
ployers, and fully harmonious economies in which all agents are persistent cooperators. Moreover,
due to transactions costs (negative R payoffs) and opportunity costs (0 wallflower payoffs), social
welfare can still be low even if all active agents are persistent cooperators. These evolutionary
outcomes are systematically related to market structure and to ex ante capacity constraints as
represented by the worker offer quota wq and the employer acceptance quota eq.
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B. Findings for 'Endogenous-Type^Labor Markets
Consider an endogenous-type labor market economy fe'comprising 24'worker-employers with
a worker offer quota wq = 1 and an employer acceptance quota* e'^ = 24. These quota values indicate
that e has a high excess job capacity in' the sense that the total number of work offers'the employers
can accept in each trade cycle fax exceeds the ma3dmum number of work offers that workers can
make. As depicted in Figure 1(a), the'base contractual pattern V^(e) for this economy e'is as
follows; Each worker-einjployer directs work offers'to other worker-employers without "latching.^^ '
— Insert Figure 1 About Here —
For this e, as detailed in Table 5(a),90% of the runs ,(s,e) were observed to lie in the distance
cluster 0-3. Moreprecisely, in 18of the 20runs for this e, at most 3 of the 24 worker-employers in
the final agent generation deviated from the base contractual pattern V°{e). Moreover, the mean
UD profile for distance cluster 0-3 was 3%, meaning that on average only 3% of the agents in the
final generation of each run in this distance cluster'"engaged in aggressive worksite behavior. The
mean PWF profile for this distance cluster was 1%, i.e.,'on average, only 1% of the agents in the
final generation of each run in this distance cluster were both unemployed (as workers) and vacant
(as employers). The mean PC profile for this'distahce cluster was 96%, iie., on average, 96%' of the
agents in the final generation of each'run in.this distance cluster endedup engaging in persistently
cooperative behavior. Finally, the mean FIT profile for this distance cluster was 1.36, meaning
that the agents in the final generation ofeach*run iii this distance cluster ended'up with an average'
utility level' (per interaction) that was very close to the mutual cooperation payoff level of 1.40.
worker is said to be latched totan employer' z if he works for z continuously (in'each successive trade cycle)'
rather than intermittently (randomly or recurrently). In the directed graph representations for base contractual
patterns inFigures, 1,3, and 4, below, latched persistent,relationships are depicted asstraight edges and intermittent
persistent relationships are depicted as zig-zag edges.
Tables 5, 6,rand 7, below, the standard deviations for.the ,UD (unprovoked.defector), PWF (persistent'
wallflower), andPC (persistent cooperator) profiles aremeasured in percentages; they appear in parentheses beneath
themean values for these profQes and are rounded off to the nearest integer value.. Also, the standard deviations
for the FIT (fitness) profiles appear in parentheses below themean FIT profiles and ate rounded off to two decimal
places. The calculation of these standard deviations is not applicable (NA) for distance clusters encompassing only
one-run, i.e., for distance clusters encompassing only'5% of the total sample o'f 20 resiized economies.
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— Insert Table 5 About Here —
A rough stability check was conducted for each of the 18 realized economies (6,e) in distance
cluster 0-3 for this high excess job capacity economy t to check whether the information recorded
in Table 5(a) for the final (fiftieth) generations appeared to be informative for other generations as
well. Specifically, holding all other parameter values fixed, the number of generations was increased
to 100 and the minimum, average, and maximum fitness scores attained by the agents in each of
these 100 generations were recorded and graphically depicted. Figure 2 depicts the stability results
obtained for the realized economy (413,e) with distance value 0; these results are typical of the
stability results obtained for all economies in distance cluster 0-3. The average fitness scores are
seen to fluctuate closely around the mutual cooperation payoff level, 1.40, over generations 10
through 100.
— Insert Figure 2 About Here —
As seen in Table 5(a), two outlier runs also occurred for this high excess job capacity e at
distance values 11 and 23. The outlier run at distance 11 is characterized by a high degree of
latching and a high degree of RD behavior. The outlier run at distance 23 is even more interesting.
A wallflower crash occurs in generation 18, in the sense that almost all agents become persistent
wallflowers. Specifically, UD and RD behavior are so prevalent among generation 18 agents that
most quickly become intolerable to all other agents as worksite partners; indeed, only three worksite
interactions take place in each of the three final trade cycles. By generation 50 this outlier run is
stiU in an unsettled state. As seen in Table 5(a), 96% of the agents engagein UD behavior, although
88% ultimately end up in latched PC relationships. The stability check for this realized economy
indicates, however, that the economy fully recovers from the wallflower crash by generation 64; UD
behavior is rare among generation 64 agents and most succeed in establishing PC relationships.
Moreover, this recovery is sustained through generation 100.
AU of these observations would appear to have a simple structural explanation. In endogenous-
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type economies, all agents evolve together in the evolution step. Hence, any worksite strategies
garnering below-average fitness scores are soon, eliminated ^d,replaced with variants of more
successful strategies. A strong evolutionary inducement thus exists towards uniform expressed
worksite behavior and, in particular, towards mutual cooperation, which is the uniform expressed
worksite behavior that generates the highest agent fitness scores. The only issue, then, is the extent
to which the ex ante capacity constraints result in transactions costs (negative refusal payoffs) for
workers trying to find tolerable job openings. In the case of high excess job capacity, workers face
. -i'" ' . . i 'I' I'li ' . J'i ; • ' .1
zero structural risk of refusal from employers due to ex ante capacity constraints; employers only
' ' ' • I " I-' • j. ' 1" A • ' . I "
refuse workers if they engage in an intolerable number of worksite defections.
This situation changes dramatically, however, as job capacity is incrementally tightened. As
depicted in Figure 1 and detailed in Table 5, the base contractual pattern changes from random
dispersion ofwork offers to disjoint doubly^latched pairings ofworkers and employers, and average
agent fitness scores monotonically decrease. It is not aggression or predation in the form of UD or
'1 ; .1 , O - . .5 r . V
RD behavior that results in lower fitness scores for the agents in these tighter job capacity cases but
rather the ever larger accumulation of transaction costs (negative refusal payoffs) that the agents
' • • I 1 , j v-i . I • . . n;r- . ,
- incur in their attempts to find tolerable worksite partners.
Q. Findings for Two-Sided Labor,Markets , >
Next consider the case of a two-sided'labor market economy e comprising 12 pure workers
and 12 pure employers ^with;,a worker,, offer quota^iy.g, —. ,1 and an.,employer acceptance quota
eq —12, implying that excess job capacity is high. Indeed, the structural risk to workers of having
their work offers refused by employers on the .basis of limited ex ante-acceptance.capacity is zero.
In contrast,^ employers are forced to, remain .vacant unless workers,.happen to,direct work-offers .
their,way, implying that the employers face a substantial structural risk .of incurring wallflower
payoffs. The economy p thus represents,a,"workers' market." As.depicted in Figur.e 3(a),,the.base
contractud pattern y°(e) for this .economy, e.is as follows: Each worker is latched, to at ,least.one
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employer, and no employer is vacant. •
— Insert Figure 3 About Here —
As seen in Table 6(a), 75% of the runs (5, e) for this high excess job capacity e were observed
to lie in the distance cluster 3-9. In this distance cluster, the very low mean FIT value of 0.35
for employers is diie to two factors: a high vacancy rate (high mean PWF percentage) due to high
excess job capacity; and aggressive and persistently predacious behavior (high mean XJD and low
mean PC percentages) by workers that induces retaliatory RD behavior in some employers.
The persistent contractual networks that arise for the runs {s,e) in distance cluster 3-9 reveal
the following typical scenario: RD workers latch on to a selected subset of employers and drive down
their fitness scores to small positive values, leaving other employers vacant with approximately zero
fitness scores. (Indeed, the distance D°{s,e) for each run (5,e) in distance cluster 3-9 is essentially a
count of the number ofpersistently vacant employers, i.e., the number ofemployers whoare PWFs.)
This scenario ensures that the worksite strategies of the exploited employers are advantaged in the
evolution step relative to the worksite strategies of the employers who are vacant. Since (pure)
workers and (pure) employers evolve separately, the worksite strategies of the exploited employers
tend to reproduce into the next generation. In this way the workers breed and maintain a subset
of largely cooperative employers that they repeatedly exploit to their benefit.
— Insert Table 6 About Here —
Table 6(a) also shows that the remaining 25% of the runs for this e lie in a second distance
cluster 23-24. The mean FIT value of 1.02 achieved by employers in this second distance cluster is
higher than that achieved in distance cluster 3-9 due to the highermean percentage of PC behavior
exhibited by both workers and employers. This mean FIT value is nevertheless substantially below
the mutual cooperation payoiF level, 1.40, due to the 5% vacancy rate among employers, a structual
consequence of high excess job capacity that is independent of how cooperatively the employers
behave in their worksite interactions. The typical contractual pattern exhibited in this distance
23
cluster is PC workers randomly directing work oiFers among employers without latching. Note that
the mean'FIT value 1.39 achieved by workers is very close to the'mutual cooperation payofFlevel.
When excess job capacity is reduced to^zero, the typical contractual:network. dramatically
changes. As depicted in Figure 3(b) and detailed in Table 6(b), about 80% of the workers now
form persistent relationships with employers in the form of disjoint doubly-latched pairings. The
' • , ' 1 ' - I. . j 11 • • • . ; ! ' , • "'
reason for the latching is that workers who fail to latch,tend to accumulate large transactions costs
(large numbers of negative refusal payoffs) and so become relatively disadvanted in the evolution
I ; I I ' I •• ^ ' r, • ' ..'l.l'l 'i'r. . <'•
step relative to those who latch. Nevertheless, even workers who succeed in latching on to one
employer typically accumulate 2 or 3 refusal payoffs from a wide range of employers on the way to
I . '' • W •' . i I 'n: -'f ' ' rIi" ."I I ' j" • ! ' ' '
attaining this, coordinated state, and these transactions costs tend to lower the mean FIT value of
'• • . ) I I ' . .(r i < . • r ' . ' ' I ' • '
workers relative to employers.
The stability checks conducted for this zero excess job capacity case reveal that many of the
I ; ' - "' i ' " 1. 'i' ' • ' t' '
realized economies exhibit unsettled average fitness score behavior over generations l through 100
♦
in the form of persistent drifting, bubbling, or regime shifts. The reason for this appears to be
that contractual networks are particularlyVulheraiDle" to initially cooperative mutant invaders when
excess job capacity is zero since the networks formin response to transactions costs and yet support
largely PC or even c:c worksite^behavior. , ,,
As job capacity keeps tightening, workers have an increasingly difficult time forming any persis
tent relationships with employers, a finding indicated in Figure 3 by the decrecising: size of worker
boxes relative to employer boxes as one moves from part (a) to part,(d); This increased coordi
nation failure is detailed in Table 6. Note, in paxticular, the growing meanj percentage of; workers
who become.unemployed (PWFs) as-Job capacity successively tightens..
D. Findings for Partially-Fluid Labor Markets
Finally, consider a partially-fluid labor market economy .encomprising.S pur.e workers (pw),
pure employers (pe), and.,8 .worker,-employers (we) with, a worker offer-quota wq =.l.and an
24-.
employer acceptance quota eq = 16, implying that excess job capacity is high. As depicted in
Figure 4(a), the base contractual pattern V®(e) for this economy e is as follows: Each worker
directs work offers to employers without latching, and no pure employer is vacant.
— Insert Figure 4 About Here —
As seem in Table 7(a), the runs (5,6) for this e are divided about equally into three distance
clusters. In the first distance cluster, although all agents exhibit a high degree of PC behavior, and
few become persistent wallflowers, pure employers nevertheless tend to accumulate large numbers of
wallflower payoffs. Consequently, pure employers have a mean FIT value, 1.03, that is low relative
to the mean FIT value of 1.38 for pure workers and 1.38 for worker-employers. In the remaining
two distance clusters, there is a substantial increase in latching behavior. Also, agents (particularly
workers) engage in increased UD and RD behavior,* and there is an increase in unemployment
among pure workers and vacancy among pure employers that results in relatively low mean FIT
values for these two agent types.
— Insert Table 7 About Here —
The stability checks for the 20 runs for this high excess job capacity economy e reveal unsettled
average fitness score behavior over generations 1 through 100 in the form of a wallflower collapse
(1 run), bubbles (2 runs), regime shifts (6 runs), and persistent drifting (4 runs). It was at first
conjectured that this observed instability might be due to the sm^ population size of 8 for each
agent type. Surprisingly, however, when the experiments were re-run with an increased population
size of 12 for each agent type, keeping all other parameter values fixed, the resulting distance values,
worksite behaviors, and social welfare outcomes closely resembled those obtained for the smaller
population size.
It therefore appears that the instabilities observed in average fitness scores for these individual
runs may instead be due to the fiuid role played by worker-employers. In particular, the abil
ity of worker-employers to function either as workers or as employers permits them to crowd out
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tte pure iworkers. or the pure'employers, causing them to degenerate'into PWFs; In addition,
worker-employers have the unique ability to form.a self-sufficient inetwork of contractual relation
ships without the participation of^either pure workers or pure employers.. Indeed, the persistent
contractual networks for the second distance cluster in .Table 7(a) are.characterized by degeneracies
ofthistype.' • , i. , ; . ..i" . . .
As job capacity is-incrementaUy tightened, .the risk to pure employers of high wallflower,payoff
accumulation recedes and is replaced by the risk to pure workers of high refusal payoffiaccumu-:
lation. As seen in Table 7, the increasingly favorable structurad setting for pure employers tends
to encourage increased UD behavior'by'pure employers'and-to discourage UD behavior by pure
workers. Consequently, there is an increased ,tendency for the flexible worker-employer agents to
I IJ . ' I . I .n I ,1 . - . '" ' I "• i I r
behave as pure employers, in the sense that they continue to receive work offers but they ultimately
stop making any work offers themselves.
This tendency is seen in the changing nature of the base contractual patterns depicted in
Figure 4, which give the most predominant types of contractual networks that form as job capacity
is decreased from high excess to tight. In particular, as seen in Figure 4(c) and Table 7(c), in
75% of the runs for the tight job capacity case nearly all of the worker-employers behave as pure
employers in their persistent relationships. When job capacity becomes extremely tight, however,
Figure 4(d) and Table 7(d) show that complete coordination failure occurs in 75% of the runs, in
the sense that aU agents in these runs degenerate into persistent wallflowers.
Finally, comparing part (a) of Figure 4 with parts (b), (c), and (d), note the extraordinarily
strong disciplinary role played by ex ante capacity constraints in the determination ofevolutionary
outcomes for partially-fluid labor market economies. For example, as one moves from high excess
job capacity in part (a) to tight job capacity in part (b), the economy moves from diffusive work
offers to disjoint doubly-latched triads consisting ofone pure worker, one worker-employer, andone
pure employer, with welfare outcomes shifting decidedly in favor of thepure employers.
Indeed, as indicated in Figures 1 and 3 as well, ex ante capacity constraints play a strong
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coordinating role in all of tke previously reported experimental findings. As suggested by Gode
and Sunder (1993), when attempting to understand tlie cause of perceived regularities in market
outcomes, it is important to carefully separate the effects of institutional constraints per se from
the effects of the cognitive functioning of the agents participating in the market. It will be inter
esting to determine, in future studies, the extent to which the network patterns determined for the
experiments at h^d are retained under similar ex ante capacity- conditions as the modelling for
agent cognition is varied.
VI. Concluding Remarks
In order for the TNG labor market framework to become a useful tool for illuminating real-
world labor market processes, it must be better adapted to specific labor market contexts using
natural data, survey data, and human-subject laboratory data.
For example, as stressed in the empirical study by Bewley (1998), economists need to take
better account in their labor market models of the importance of social and psychological factors
in determining worksite interactions and outcomes. The current TNG labor market modelling of
worksite interactions as two-person games played between autonomous workers and employers with
internal cognitive structure is only a first small step in this direction. In future studies, signalling
among agents (e.g., wage bids and offers) needs to be introduced, and capacity constraints must
be endogenized so that they are determined as a function of past decisions and events. Also, the
role of government regulations (e.g., minimum wage laws) must be considered. Finally, the labor
market framework needs to be imbedded in a more complete modelling of a decentralized market
economy.
Nevertheless, it is hoped that the findings presented in the previous section illustrate how an
agent-based computational approach can facilitate the rigorous and routine experimental study of
non-steady-state labor market dynamics.
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Figure 1: Base Contractual-Pattern's for Endogenous-Type Labor Markets with Different Ex
Ante Capacities. A relatively larger box for the worker-employers (WE) under a particular capacity
specification indicates that the worker-employers achieve a relatively higher mean FIT value under this
capacity specification in realized economies whose contractual networks approximate the base contractual
pattern. Straight directed edges indicate continuous persistent relationships (latching) and zig-zag directed
edges indicate intermittent persistent relationships.
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Figure 2: Stability Check for an Endogenous-Type Economy with High Excess Job Capacity.
The maximum, minimum, and average fitness scores are graphed for agent generations 1 through 100. By
generation 25 the average fitness scores closely fluctuate around 1.40, the mutujil cooperation payoff level.
D° Cluster, . % Runs .Mean-UD ..Mean PWF Mean PC Mean FIT
0-3 90% ' 3% i 1%. 96% 1.36
' 1 (3%) i (2%)i (4%) (.05);
11 •5% 8% • 0%j 38% 1.34
(NA) (NA) (NA) (NA)
23 5% 96% ' 0%: 88% 1.13
- - - --(NA) - (NA) (NA) (NA)
Table 5(a): Endogenous-Type Labor Markets with High Excess Job Capacity
•. r.
"i?®'Cluster % Runs Mean UD Mean' PWF" Mean PC Mean'FlT
0-4 100% 8% 2% 96% 1.19
(22%) (3%); (5%) (.06)
Table 5(b): Endogenous-Type Labor Markets with Zero Excess Job Capacity'
D" Cluster %-Ruhs Mean^UD Mean PWF Mean PC Mean FIT
2-11 85% _ 1%- 1% 98% 0.95
• (2%) (2%), (4%) ^ (.04)
24 •15%, 100%
1—'
o
o
0%
1
p
1 (0%) 1 (0%) (0%) (•00)
I
Table 5(c); Endogenous-Type Labor Markets with Tight Job Capacity
D° Cluster % Runs Mean UD Mean PWF Mean PC Mean FIT
2-12 70% • 3% 3% 94% 0.89
' - , - - (5%) (7%) (9%) •.(•07) •
24 30% 100% 100% 0% -0.16
(0%) (0%) (0%) (.00)
Table 5(d): Endogenous-Type Labor Market^ with Extremely Tight Job Capacity
Table 5. Experimental Findings for Endbgneous-Typ'e Labor Markets
with Different Ex-Ante Capacities '
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(wq=l, eq=12)
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PE
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(wq=2, eq=l)
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(b) Zero Excess Job Capacity
(wq=eq=l)
pw pw
pe pe
(d) Extremely Tight Job Capacity
(wq=:12, eq=l)
Figure 3: Base Contractual Patterns for Two-Sided Labor Markets with Different Ex Ante
Capacities. A relatively larger box for an agent type —pure workers (PW) or pure employers (PE) —
under a particular capacity specification indicates that this agent type achieves a relatively higher mean FIT
value under this capacity specification in the realized economies whose contractual networks approximate
the base contractual pattern. Straight directed edges indicate continuous persistent relationships (latching)
and zig-zag directed edges indicate intermittent persistent relationships.
D" Cluster % Runs Mean UD Mean PWF Mean PC Mean FIT
pw. Pe- pw pe pw pe pw pe..
3-9 75% 97%
(5%)
16%
(34%)
, 2%
1(3%)
40%
(1-2%)/
3%
m
39%
(28%)
1.74
(.27)
0.35'
(.14)
'23-24 25%. 2%
(3%)
5%
(7%)
• 2%
!(3%)
5%
(7%)
"98%
(3%)
95% -
(7%)
-1.39
(.02)
1.02.-
(,03) i
1
Table 6(a): Two-Sided Labor Markets vith High Excess Job Capacity
D" Cluster % Runs Mean UD Mean'PWF Mean PC Mean FIT
pw ' pe pw pe '•pw • •pe pw ' pe
0-2 " 80% ' ^ J5%
(32%)
22%
(38%)
1%
(3%)
1%
(3%)
94%
(6%)
86% ,
(25%)
•1.07
(.20)
1.34
(.21)
4 5% 100%
(NA)
100%
(NA)
17%
(NA)
17%
(NA)
0%
(NA)
0%
(NA)
0.62
(NA)
0.29
(NA)
24 15% 0%
(0%)
22%
(20%)
0%
(0%)
8%
(0%)
89%
(16%)
78%
(20%)
0.24
(.08)
1.42
(.05)
Table 6(b): Two-SidediLabor Markets with Zero Excess Job Capacity
D° Cluster % Runs Mean UD Mean'PWF Mean PC Mean FIT
pw pe pw pe pw pe pw .pe
0-7 55% 2% 5% 19% 4% 81%- 96% 0.30 M.35
(3%) (9%) (10%) (7%) (10%)- -(6%) (.05) •{.09)
24 45% 100% 90% 82% 77% 3% 5% 0.04 0.22
(0%) (28%) (26%) : (34%) (8%) (13%) (.20) (.39)
Table 6(c): Two-Sided Labor Markets with Tight Job Capacity
1
Cluster % Runs Mean UD MeaniPWF Mean PC Mean FIT
pw pe pw pe pw pe pw pe
0-6 35% 1% 1% 12% 1% 86% 96% 0.31 1.37
(3%) (3%) . (4%) (3%) (7%) (6%) (.03) (.06)
15-17 20% 10% 92% 35% 2% 17% 25% 0.35 1.22
(i4%) (14%) (7%) (4%) (20%) (34%) f.l7) f.20)
24 45% 100% 100% 100% , 100% 0% 0% -0.10 -0.01
(0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (.00) (.00)
Table 6(d): Two-Sided Labor Markets'with Extremely Tight Job Capacity
• • T
i I ! '
Table 6. Experimental Findings,for. Two-Sided Labor Markets
with Different Ex, Ante Capacities
PW
WE
PE
(a) High Excess Job Capacity
(wq=l, eq=16)
PW
WE
PE
(c) Tight Job Capacity
(wq=2, eq=l)
pw pw
we we
(b) Zero Excess Job Capacity
(wq=l=eq)
PW
WE
PE
(d) Extremely Tight Job Capacity
(wq=16, eq=l)
Figure 4: Base Contractual Patterns for Partially-Fluid Labor Markets with Different Ex Ante
Capacities. A relatively larger box for an agent type — pure workers (PW), worker-employers (WE), or
pure employers (PE) — under a particular capacity specification indicates that this agent type achieves a
relatively higher mean FIT value under this capacity specification in the realized economies whose contractual
networks approximate the base contractual pattern. Straight directed edges indicate continuous persistent
- ^
relationships (latching) and zig-zag directed edges indicate intermittent persistent relationships.
D"
Cist.
% of
Runs
Mean UD ean PWF Mean PC Mean FIT
pw pe we pw pe we pw pe we pw pe we
0-2 30% 2%
(5%)
2%
(5%)
6%
(10%)
2%
(5%)
2%
(5%)
0%
(0%)
98%
(5%)
98%
(5%)
81%
(32%)
1.38
(.01)
1.03
(.03)
1.38
(.03)
6^9 35% 25%
(40%)
41%
(48%)
39%
(41%)
14%
(35%)
41%
(48%)
0% .
(0%)
75%
(40%)
48%
(41%)
64%
(38%)
1.16
(.11)
0.73
(.24)
1.25
(.09)
16-21 35% 98%
(4%)
23%
(38%)
98%
(4%)
16%
(35%)
30%
(30%)
2%
(4%)
18%
(34%)
40%
(37%)
21%
(35%)
1.13
(.63)
0.55
(.25)
1.43
(.30)
Table 7(a): Partially-Fluid Labor Markets with High Excess Job Capacity
D"
Cist.
%of
Runs
• Mean UD Mean PWF Mean PC Mean FIT
pw pe we pw pe we pw pe we pw pe we
0-6 80% 6%
(24%)
20%
(10%)
9%
(24%)
0%
(0%)
1%
(3%)
2%
(4%)
98%
(4%)
92%
(24%)
97%
(5%)
1.16
(.06)
1.42
(.14)
1.11
(.13)
16-24 20% 100%
(0%)
28%
(42%)
47%
(47%)
28%
(42%)
25%
(31%)
6%
(11%)
0%
(0%)
19%
(14%)
53%
(47%)
0.20
(.17)
0.87
(.33)
0.87
(.22)
Table 7(b): Partially-Fluid Labor Markets with Zero Excess Job Capacity
Cist.
% of
Runs
Mean UD Mean PWF Mean PC Mean FIT
pw pe we pw pe we pw pe we pw pe we
0-7 75% 2%
(4%)
19%
(38%)
17%
(34%)
6%
(8%)
4%
(7%)
1%
(3%)
75%
(28%)
80%
(38%)
83%
(34%)
0.63
(.19)
1.30
(.19)
0.90
(.07)
10 10% 0%
(0%)
50%
(50%)
50%
(50%)
19%
(6%)
44%
(44%)
50%
(50%)
81%
(6%)
56%
(44%)
50%
(50%)
0.32
(.10)
0.85
(.53)
0.46
(.49)
24 15% 100%
(0%)
100%
(0%)
100%
(0%)
100%
(0%)
100%
(0%)
100%
(0%)
0%
(0%)
0%
(0%)
0%
(0%)
-0.13
(.00)
-0.02
(.00)
-0.13
(.00)
Table 7(c): Partially-Fluid LaborMarkets with Tight Job Capacity
D"
Cist.
% of
Runs
Mean UD Mean PWF Mean PC Mean FIT
pw pe we pw pe we pw pe we pw pe we
0 75% 100%
(0%)
100%
(0%)
100%
(0%)
100%
(0%)
100%
(0%)
100%
(0%)
0%
(0%)
0%
(0%)
0%
(0%)
-0.13
(.00)
-0.01
(.00)
-0.13
(.00)
16 5% 0%
(NA)
0%
(NA)
100%
(NA)
25%
(NA)
0%
(NA)
25%
(NA)
38%
(NA)
88%
(NA)
0%
(NA)
0.52
(NA)
1.33
(NA)
0.57
(NA)
23-24 20% 0%
(0%)
6%
(11%)
3%
(5%)
0%
(0%)
3%
(5%)
0%
(0%)
97%
(5%)
97%
(5%)
97%
(5%)
0.39
(.07)
1.36
(.07)-
0.79
(.04)
Table 7(d): PartiaJly-Fluid Market Experiments with Extremely Tight Job Capacity
Table 7. Experimental Findings for Partially-Fluid Labor Markets
with Different Ex Ante Capacities
